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The fragmentation of intermediary liability in the UK 
Daithí Mac Síthigh, University of Edinburgh 
Final version published in Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, 2013, 
8(7), 521-531. 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
The liability of Internet intermediaries has been a key question in information 
technology law for nearly two decades.2 There is a well-understood difference in how 
this issue is treated in US and European Union law.3 Federal law in the US 
distinguishes between liability for intellectual property infringements on one hand and 
a range of other civil actions on the other. This is because section 230 
Communications Decency Act (1996) provides a general exclusion from liability, i.e. 
that intermediaries are not to be treated as a ‘publisher or speaker’ in respect of 
information provided by others. Taking a different approach, section 512 Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (1998) establishes, in respect of some intermediaries, a 
conditional scheme (including what is often termed ‘notice and takedown’ or NTD) in 
the field of copyright. This scheme increases the legal risk to the intermediary, 
requiring as it does specific procedures to be put in place and actions taken.4 The 
result is that, in practice, US intermediaries must pay more attention to allegations of 
copyright infringement than to allegations of defamation.  
The argument advanced in this article is that, despite the existence of different cross-
cutting provisions on liability in the Electronic Commerce Directive [‘ECD’],5 a 
similar type of hierarchy of harm is emerging in the United Kingdom, albeit in a less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thanks to Dr. Emily Laidlaw (University of East Anglia) for reviewing a draft of this article, and to 
co-presenters and audience members at the 5RB Conference (London, September 2012) and LLT 7th 
Annual Media Law Conference (London, March 2012), where earlier versions of this paper were 
presented. 
2 See generally the thorough consideration of the question in L Edwards, ‘The fall and rise of 
intermediary liability online’ in L Edwards & C Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet (3rd edn, 2009). 
The focus of this article is on the recently-emerged tensions in UK law, and will not attempt to reassess 
the earlier debate on the adoption of the 1996, 1998 and 2000 provisions.  
3 C Marsden, ‘Internet service providers: content liability, control, and neutrality’ in I Walden (ed), 
Telecommunications Law & Regulation (4th edn, 2012) 703-711. 
4 Discussed in J Urban & L Quilter, ‘Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ (2006) 4 Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal 621 
5 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178. 
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clear fashion than is the case in the United States. This phenomenon will be explained 
by reference to defamation, privacy, and copyright. It will also be shown how the 
interaction between domestic and EU law and between statute and common laws 
affect the position of intermediaries, again indicating a difference with the simpler US 
approach. The intention is not to make a normative claim about intermediary liability, 
but to present a critical perspective on how different liability regimes have come into 
being. 
A distinction will be made between four types of intermediary, based on the lines 
drawn in the ECD (all of which are ‘information society service providers’ (ISSPs) as 
defined in and in relation to the ECD – although not every ISSP is necessarily an 
intermediary). The law as it stands has different expectations of these categories, and 
they carry out different technical functions too. Political statements regarding ‘ISPs’ 
without further distinction often serve to confuse rather than illustrate; the problem 
also affects the interpretation of prior decisions. 
The first type is a mere conduit, i.e. one which provides access to the Internet (often 
what is meant in business by the term ISPs), such as Virgin Media or TalkTalk. The 
second is a cache, i.e. temporary storage (which will not be considered in any detail 
here as few if any novel or distinctive issues are raised). Third is the class of ‘hosts’, 
such as YouTube or Twitter. Finally, there is the category of search engines, which – 
in so far as implemented in the UK – is not covered by the immunity provisions of the 
ECD. (In some member states, search engines are so protected). 
The position of conduits, hosts and search engines will now be considered, followed 
by a concluding section which summarises the position of each in respect of the three 
areas of law within the scope of this article. 
II. CONDUITS 
A. Overview 
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The main provision for mere conduits is Article 12 ECD, which offers generous 
immunity from liability; defamation cases (e.g. Bunt v Tilley6) demonstrate this 
practice, and there has been little discussion of recasting or amending the provision.  
However, article 12 does not tell the full story. Article 12(3) does not appear to rule 
out injunctions (i.e. without liability) against mere conduits, subject to the ‘no duty to 
monitor’ requirement of article 15 ECD. Article 15 itself is unclea.7 Norwich 
Pharmacal orders (also without any suggestion of liability, indeed quite the opposite) 
are also available against mere conduits. Finally, it has not been a barrier to the new 
(EU) provision (first proposed as mandatory, but now an option for member states)8 
for blocking images of child sexual abuse.9 
Furthermore, the picture is even more complex in the case of copyright, for three 
reasons:  
(i) s 97A Copyright, Designs & Patents Act [‘CDPA’], transposing 
Directive 2001/29,10 can and has been used for ‘blocking’ of 
specified websites; 
(ii) s 17 Digital Economy Act [‘DEA’] provided for a new type of 
blocking injunction, although its future is uncertain; and  
(iii) the DEA also established a ‘graduated response’ system, not based 
on liability but demonstrating a different Parliamentary approach to 
mere conduits.  
 
B. Section 97A 
The effect of s 97A CDPA is demonstrated in the trio of ‘Newzbin’ cases. In 20th 
Century Fox v Newzbin11 copyright infringement was established (authorisation, 
communication to the public, common design for copying) and an injunction granted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 [2006] EWHC 407 (QB). 
7 European Commission, ‘Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market’ SEC(2011) 
1641, 47. Some of the gaps have been filled in by the CJEU in cases where the additional provisions of 
the Information Society Directive or IP Rights Enforcement Directive are engaged: Case C-70/10 
Scarlet Extended v SABAM, Case C-324/09 L’Oreal v eBay. 
8 Marsden (n 3) 728. 
9 Directive 2011/92/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography [2011] OJ L335, art 25. 
10 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society [2001] OJ L167. 
11 [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch). 
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against the Newzbin website (an index of binary files available via Usenet), albeit in 
narrow terms. Subsequently, Newzbin was closed - but an offshore Newzbin2 was 
launched shortly afterwards. 20th Century Fox v BT (no 1)12 therefore saw an 
injunction granted against BT to block access to Newzbin2 using the ‘Cleanfeed’ 
system it already uses (long predating EU interest) to block access to material on the 
Internet Watch Foundation’s list (images of child sexual abuse).13 It was confirmed 
that neither Article 12 nor 15 ECD were a barrier to the injunction sought. Finally in 
20th Century Fox v BT (no 2)14 the form of the injunction is set out, along with an 
interesting debate on costs and on the differences between s 97A and Norwich 
Pharmacal orders. Further (unreported, unopposed) injunctions were issued against 
other ISPs.15 
A slightly different approach is that in Dramatico v BSkyB & ors16 where the case 
begins as one between the record companies and the ‘top six’ ISPs17 (who were 
unrepresented). The website being considered, The Pirate Bay, was not the subject of 
UK proceedings at any point. Subsequently, a second judgment (in respect of five of 
the six; BT separately) dealt with the granting of an injunction under s 97A.18 It was 
noted that a two-stage approach should not be assumed to be required. The present 
position must surely be one where section 97A orders are a feature of the obligations 
of mere conduits in the UK. Indeed, in 2013, a single case (EMI & ors v BSkyB & 
ors)19 demonstrates that the ‘formula’ is now clear. This is a case by a group of labels, 
in respect of three different sites, against all of the top six, with both the determination 
of infringement and the granting of the order dealt with in the decision. 
C. Blocking injunctions under the DEA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
13 On Cleanfeed and the IWF, see TJ McIntyre, 'Child Abuse Images and Cleanfeeds: Assessing 
Internet Blocking Systems' in I Brown (ed), Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) 277, 282-3; E Laidlaw, ‘The Responsibilities of Free Speech Regulators: An 
Analysis of the Internet Watch Foundation' (2012) 20 International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 312, 316-317; 319-320; Marsden (n 3) 727. 
14 [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch). 
15 D Worth, ‘Motion Picture Association asks Virgin and TalkTalk to block Newzbin 2’ (V3, 9 
November 2011) http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2123843/virgin-talktalk-hit-newzbin-blocking-
request-mpa. 
16 [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch). 
17 BT, Virgin, Sky, TalkTalk, Everything Everywhere (i.e. Orange & T-Mobile), o2. 
18 [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch). 
19 [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). 
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A further power for a ‘blocking injunction in respect of a location on the internet’ is 
provided for in s 17 DEA, although this power would only be available if further 
secondary legislation were adopted. This is not based on actual knowledge but does 
apply to the same category of entities (‘service providers’) as defined in s 97A CDPA. 
It came to be in the final version of the Act after the withdrawal of a more extensive 
power to grant blocking injunctions. The explanation was that it would form a part of 
the strategy to tackle copyright infringement, by addressing Web-based infringement 
as opposed to the peer-to-peer form of infringement, which would be tackled through 
the graduated response system (discussed below). Although the DEA was the subject 
of judicial review,20 the criticism of s 17 was not addressed, on the grounds that no 
secondary legislation had yet been adopted!21  
Ofcom reported on s 17 DEA in 2011,22 expressing various doubts on the efficacy of 
the section as a response to copyright infringement. In policy terms, this raises some 
questions about the s 97A CDPA route too, although the success of cases under this 
section has somewhat lessened the demand for implementation of s 17. The 
Government noted it would not introduce secondary legislation in 201123 and in June 
2012 announced that it would propose the repeal of s 17 DEA.24 However, the attempt 
by Parliament to add more duties (in respect of copyright alone) demonstrates the 
temptation of regulatory co-opting of mere conduits. 
D. Graduated response  
While not an issue of liability or takedown per se, the rollout of the scheme of the 
Digital Economy Act for dealing with online copyright infringement is significant, 
because it changes the perceived position of the ISP as a neutral conduit, and may 
lead to better record-keeping and related activities. It also calls into question the 
definition of a conduit; see for example the debate during the DEA’s passage on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 R (BT) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin). 
21 Ibid [94]. 
22 Ofcom, ‘“Site blocking” to reduce online copyright infringement: a review of section 17 & 18 of the 
Digital Economy Act’ (27 May 2010) http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-
blocking.pdf. 
23 Intellectual Property Office, ‘Sweeping intellectual property reforms to boost growth and add 
billions to the UK economy’ (press release, 3 August 2011) http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-
release/press-release-2011/press-release-20110803.htm.  
24 Department for Culture, Media & Sport, ‘Measures to tackle Internet piracy moved forward today’ 
(press release, 26 June 2012) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/next-steps-to-tackle-internet-
piracy. 
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definition of a service provider as applied to providers of wifi hotspots such as 
libraries and cafes.25  
One must also note the relevance of the existing Cleanfeed system (designed for a 
different purpose) in persuading the High Court to make the order it did regarding 
Newzbin2; will the existence of the scheme required by the DEA make other orders 
more technically feasible and so more likely to be granted? 
The system proposed as of a draft code of June 201226 is for rightsholders to notify 
ISPs of infringement by one of its users, for the ISP to identify the user and warn 
them, and for the ISP to notify rightsholders of the (anonymous) details of repeat 
infringers. This would only apply to the ‘top six’ ISPs. The system would facilitate 
the initiation of legal action by a rightsholder, presumably commencing with a 
Norwich Pharmacal order). In the DEA, infringement is not further defined. From the 
supporting documents and technical reports, it is clear that the focus is on peer-to-peer 
services. In such a case, all downloaders are essentially also uploaders; the latter is 
easier to detect and indeed to define as infringement. Subsequently, if activated (no 
earlier than a year after the initial code comes into force), a further provision will 
require ISPs to take action against customers who are repeat infringers, through what 
are termed ‘technical measures’ (e.g. slowing down of connection speed). 
E. Conclusion 
All of these obligations are presented in a careful way so as to avoid suggesting that 
the high mark of immunity under article 12 ECD has not been compromised. 
However, a political reading of the developments demonstrates that the position of the 
intermediary is more complex than a mere reading of the law on liability. Copyright 
has been prioritised through the approval of measures that take advantage of the 
technological functions and information resources of the intermediary. The UK 
legislature was even prepared – again only for copyright – to go beyond EU law in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 HL Deb 2 December 2009, vol 715, col 786 (Lord Clement-Jones); HL Deb 12 January 2010, vol 
716, col 446 (Lord Young). See also D Mac Síthigh, ‘Law in the last mile: sharing Internet access 
through wi-fi’ (2009) 6 SCRIPTed 355 http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol6-
2/macsithigh.pdf, 366-8. 
26 Ofcom, ‘New measures to protect online copyright and inform consumers’ (press release, 26 June 
2012) http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2012/06/26/new-measures-to-protect-online-copyright-and-inform-
consumers/; Ofcom, ‘Online Infringement of Copyright and the Digital Economy Act 2010 - Notice of 
Ofcom’s proposal to make by order a code for regulating the initial obligations’ (26 June 2012) 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/infringement-notice/.  
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adoption of section 17 DEA.27 While a single one of these points might be explained 
in other ways, assembling them demonstrates that the general approach to 
intermediary liability is considered appropriate in the case of some legal wrongs, but 
insufficient in the case of others. In that context, it is not surprising to see arguments 
emerging that the effect of section 97A CDPA could be extended to other fields, not 
through the section itself (which is clearly limited to copyright) but through 
developing a common law version thereof, within the scope of section 37 Senior 
Courts Act 1981 (power of High Court to grant injunctions where just and convenient 
to do so).28 
The backdrop to all of these developments is the ongoing considerations of 
injunctions and the ECD by the Court of Justice, although so far, the English courts 
have not gone much further than noting the jurisprudence. The cases do express 
important principles on proportionality and on problems with requirements to filter.29 
The test for granting a Norwich Pharmacal order has itself been clarified30 and further 
developed (with specific reference to copyright and ISPs) in Golden Eye v 
Telefonica.31 Such detailed consideration is long overdue, given (i) the existence of 
data protection legislation and the treatment of such by the Court of Justice in similar 
cases,32 (ii) the evolution of data retention provisions (for access by public 
authorities),33 including how they interact with other data questions,34 and (iii) the 
recognition of computer history as an aspect of privacy in the European Court of 
Human Rights,35 alongside the pending fundamental rights scrutiny of data retention 
in the Court of Justice.36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Described by Bainbridge as ‘jump(ing) the gun’, i.e. not waiting for EU harmonisation in this area: D 
Bainbridge, Intellecutal property (9th ed, 2012) 199. 
28 G Busuttil, ‘The Internet and injunctions’ (conference paper, 5RB Annual Conference, 27 September 
2012) 6 (copy on file with author). See also L’Oreal v eBay [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch) [447-454]. 
29 Scarlet (n 7). See discussion in E Bonadio & M Santo, ‘ISPs cannot be ordered to adopt general and 
preventive filtering systems’ (2012) 7 JIPLP 234. 
30 RFU v Viagogo [2011] EWCA Civ 1585. 
31 [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch). 
32 e.g. Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I-271. 
33 Directive 2006/24 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks [2006] 
OJ L105. 
34 Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio. 
35 Copland v UK (2007) 45 EHRR 37 [41] 
36 Case C-293/12 DRI v Ireland. 
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All of this activity reveals something important about the purposes of regulating 
online activity in accordance with law (which could prompt a long discussion on 
lobbying, influence and legislative priorities, and strategic litigation), and 
demonstrates to critics of the current approach to liability how claims for reform can 
be articulated in respect of other wrongs. The next section will establish how liability 
itself can be seen, through a close reading, to be a site of debate regarding the harm 
caused by different types of online behaviour, in the case of hosts. 
III. HOSTS 
A. A notice-based approach 
The ECD establishes in article 14 a scheme informally known as ‘notice and 
takedown’ or ‘notice and action’. Despite the similar name, it is far less detailed than 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) ‘notice and takedown’ system for 
copyright in the US. For example, the ECD test for immunity (that a host is safe 
unless it has ‘actual knowledge of illegal activity or information’ or is ‘aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent’) and 
requirement for immunity (obligation to ‘act expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information’) does not govern the form or validity of notice. UK law 
adds a little more detail, directing courts to have regard to factors like the inclusion of 
name and address and details of the unlawful nature of the information or activity in a 
notice;37 there is also a potentially significant change of wording in transposition, 
from ‘is apparent’ to ‘would have been apparent’.38 
The European Commission completed in 2012 a review of the ECD. It suggested that, 
regarding articles 12-15, there were four types of uncertainty: definitions, conditions 
(e.g. actual knowledge), notice and takedown, and obligations to monitor. It did not 
come down in favour of amending the provisions, but did announce what it calls a 
‘horizontal initiative’.39 The purpose of this initiative is to address the different 
approaches to notice and takedown across the EU, and, being horizontal, it is about a 
general principle that would apply across causes of action and types of services. It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013, reg 22. 
38 M Collins, The law of defamation and the Internet (3rd edn, 2010) [16.68] 
39 European Commission, ‘A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-
commerce and online services’ COM(2011) 942, 14. 
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also hints at needing more detail by way of the adequacy of a notice and also quicker 
action. Consideration of a subsequent questionnaire issued by the Commission40 
supports this observation, with questions including whether hosts should have a 
notification procedure (question 10), options for the format of notices (question 12) 
and whether the requirement to act ‘expeditiously’ could be replaced by a specified 
time period (question 19). 
A further theme is whether a single approach to notice and takedown is the best one. 
The UK already goes beyond the ECD in setting out the details of how notice and 
takedown works in the special case of sections 3-4 Terrorism Act 2006, and the 
Commission reports a wide range of other practices across the EU.41 In the case of 
defamation, there are similar (although not identical) provisions for a defence of 
innocent dissemination under the Defamation Act 1996.42 
There is however a fundamental difficulty with a notice-based approach to 
intermediary liability which continues to provoke debate.43 This is the inescapable 
bias in favour of action on the part of the host, which is explained here in the style of 
Pascal’s Wager (on the logic of belief in God). Table 1 compares the positions of four 
parties, in a situation where an allegation that content is unlawful is sent by a 
complainant) to a host in respect of content uploaded by an author; the fourth party is 
a reader of the website, or the public.44 Table 1 compares the outcomes for lawful and 
unlawful content for the two options open to the host, ‘leaving up’ the content and 
‘taking it down’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 European Commission, ‘A clean and open Internet: 
Public consultation on procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content hosted by online 
intermediaries’ (4 June 2012) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/clean-and-open-
internet_en.htm.  
41 SEC(2011) 1641 (n 7) part 3.4. 
42 This article does not attempt to deal with the 1996 Act. In general, the ECD is comparable or offers 
slightly stronger protection to intermediaries: Collins (n 38) [16.47]. 
43 J Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low-level digital speech’ (2012) 71 CLJ 355, 
380-1. 
44 This is a necessary addition; “the law’s shield for service providers becomes, paradoxically, a sword 
against the public, which depends upon these providers as platforms for speech” W Seltzer, ‘Free 
speech unmoored in copyright’s safe harbour: effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment’ (2010) 
24 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 171, 175. 
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 Unlawful Lawful 
Leave Up • Harm to complainant 
(reputation), with remedy 
available (action against host 
and possibly against author) 
• Minor (deserved) harm to 
author (host’s inaction 
increases risk of action 
against)  
• Harm to host (liability) 
• Neutral to reader 
• Neutral to complainant 
• Neutral to author 
• Minor harm to host (opportunity cost 
of defending) 
• Benefit to reader (access to legal 
content) 
 
Take Down • Benefit to complainant 
• Neutral to author 
• Neutral to host (immunity) 
• Neutral to reader 
 
• Neutral to complainant, or 
(undeserved) minor benefit from 
suppression of critical speech despite 
legality) 
• Harm to author (suppression of legal 
speech, probably with no remedy 
against complainant or host) 
• Neutral or minor harm to host 
(possible dispute with author, but 
terms and conditions likely to prevent 
legal action, so limited to possible 
loss of business) 
• Harm to reader (denied access to 
legal content) 
Table 1: options available to a host on receipt of notice 
As the host is the party being asked to take action, we focus first on its choice, and 
then assess the consequences for other parties. It can so be seen that the ‘leave up’ 
option means that the outcome for the host will be either harm or minor harm, while 
the ‘take down’ option delivers the option of no harm or ‘no to minor’ harm. As such, 
without further information, the host should choose ‘take down’. However, where the 
content is legal, there is a marked difference between the ‘leave up’ (no harm to 
complainant or author and benefit to reader) and ‘take down’ (no harm to complainant, 
harm to author and reader) approaches, meaning that the optimal approach for the 
host is suboptimal for both the author and reader. Assuming that leaving up legal 
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content affecting a complainant is not (legally) harmful, the complainant’s position is 
not affected by the choice of path unless the content is unlawful. Therefore, the 
system produces the result that the host’s action will benefit or not affect the 
complainant, but harm or not affect the author or reader. The interests of the 
complainant are therefore favoured. Furthermore, adjusting the standard for what is 
‘unlawful’ – as discussed below – will be a significant step. This is because it 
increases the class of situations where lawful content is taken down. 
With this problem in mind, we can turn to three ways in which the balance may be 
shifted, all relating to defamation law. 
B. The definition of notice 
Recent cases in the High Court have added further complication to the understanding 
of article 14 ECD: Tamiz v Google45 and Davison v Habeeb.46 These develop in more 
detail a point made by the Court of Justice regarding notice.47 In both cases, Google 
(which runs the Blogger service at issue) advanced an argument that it did not have 
sufficient notice for the article 14 obligation to take down to kick in. It is made clear 
in Tamiz that a complaint about content is not notice, with it being suggested that 
there needs to be enough evidence of unlawfulness before takedown becomes 
necessary. The distinction drawn by learned authors48 between ‘unlawful’ and ‘prime 
facie unlawful’ is considered, with the former being favoured in Tamiz.49 (This debate 
has been observed in other member states too. For example, Austrian decisions adopt 
a standard that unlawfulness must be obvious to a non-lawyer without further 
investigation, meaning that certain areas e.g. trademark are unlikely to be so because 
of the need for further research).50 
Sadly, the Court of Appeal did not deal with article 14 at all in its hearing of Tamiz,51 
as it has already resolved the matter before it through the treatment of the claim as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 [2012] EWHC 449 (QB) [‘Tamiz (HC)’]. 
46 [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB). 
47 L’Oreal (n 7) [122]: ‘notifications of allegedly illegal activities or information may turn out to be 
insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated’. 
48 Compare P Milmo & W Rogers (eds), Gatley on Libel & Slander (11th edn 2008) [6.31] and Collins 
(n 38) [16.75]. 
49 Tamiz (HC) (n 45) [57]. 
50 SEC(2011) 1641 (n 7), p 34. 
51 Tamiz v Google [2013] EWCA Civ 68 [‘Tamiz (CA)’] [52]. 
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Jameel abuse.52 It is therefore difficult to offer a definitive interpretation of article 14 
at this point in time, making the Commission’s horizontal initiative particularly 
important. 
The exploration of article 14 in the context of privacy is also eagerly awaited. It has 
been argued that there is a need to development the common law or introduce a 
statutory provision to do for privacy what s 1 Defamation Act 1996 does for 
defamation,53 but this may not be necessary, if it is true that the ECD (which would 
apply to an action for breach of privacy) is broader than the 1996 Act in each case.54 
C. A condition precedent? Publication and defamation law 
There is a further point of doubt under English law on defamation liability itself 
(which could have made the notice question and indeed the ECD irrelevant). This is 
whether the host is a publisher, at common law. In Tamiz at first instance, Eady J says 
no (comparing Blogger, provocatively, with the owner of a wall on which graffiti has 
been daubed); in Davison, there is a long discussion of the status of Blogger – 
compared with giant noticeboards, conduits, search engines – and it is concluded that 
there is an arguable case that Google is a publisher. The decision at first instance in 
Tamiz, on the contrary, is that liability (as a publisher) is not present whether there is 
notice or not. The conflict (on comparable facts, regarding the same host) between the 
two decisions was thus the backdrop to the Court of Appeal’s consideration of the 
appeal in Tamiz. At this Court, the matter was be fully argued by counsel; both Tamiz 
and Davison were cases involving self-represented litigants. The court admitted the 
possibility of post-notice hosted material being considered as published by the host,55  
pulling back from Eady J’s ‘graffiti’ argument.  However, it did rule out liability in 
the situation before the host is notified, both in respect of primary and secondary 
publication.56 
Surprisingly, this finding has been greeted by outrage by advocates of free expression 
– despite the situation that the finding at first instance was a departure from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid [49-50]. 
53 M Warby, N Moreham & I Christie (eds), Tugendhat: the law of privacy and the media (2nd edn 
2011) [8.97]. 
54 Collins (n 38) [16.47]. 
55 Tamiz (CA) (n 51) [34]. 
56 Ibid [25-26] 
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generally assumed position,57 that it was already at odds with that of Davison from a 
court of the same level, that the finding in Tamiz was not based on clear precedent 
from a higher court, and that the defences (particularly article 14 ECD) have not been 
affected. So the argument that the finding ‘reads like a threat to the concept of “mere 
conduit”, the concept enshrined in the European Union e-Commerce Directive 
establishing that ISPs cannot be held responsible for content on third party blogs, 
Facebook updates, tweets etc’58 is not consistent with the actual state of affairs; hosts 
are and have never been not mere conduits, and the issue of liability remains governed 
by the ECD without change. It is perfectly fair for the system of liability to be 
criticised from a free expression point of view (indeed, that is part of the 
interpretation of table 1, above) but much less fair to suggest that the Court of Appeal 
undermined a clear and established principle. 
D. Reform of the law of defamation 
The lengthy debate leading up to the Defamation Act 2013 has seen a proliferation of 
proposed notice schemes. Lord Lester’s original Bill proposed a new defence for 
‘facilitators’, while the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill proposed a 
distinction between authored and anonymous speech (where a statement with an 
identified author would stay online with complaint appended while a takedown order 
was sought, but works of unidentified authorship would need to be taken down on 
receipt of complaint, with a ‘leave-up’ order available). This was the subject of much 
debate at its hearings and the Government has responded that it believes this scheme 
to be unworkable for various reasons.  
Section 5 of the 2013 Act59 contains a new defence for the ‘operator of a website’ 
which does make whether the author is identifiable (by a claimant) relevant. The 
defence is framed in language closer to section 230 Communications Decency Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See for example P Lambert, ‘Google and Online Liability’ (2012) 23(5) Computers & Law 11 (‘This 
goes further than even a service provider could have hoped’); R Griffiths, ‘New immunity for websites 
which host defamatory user generated content’ (2012) 23 Ent LR 145, 146 (‘marks a sea change in the 
law applicable to websites which host defamatory user generated content’). 
58 P Reidy, ‘London court ruling could have grave consequences for free speech online’ (Index on 
Censorship blog, 15 February 2012) http://blog.indexoncensorship.org/2013/02/15/london-court-
ruling-could-have-grave-consequences-for-free-speech-online/. 
59 During consideration in the House of Lords, referred to as clause 7: HL Bill 84 2012-13, 7 February 
2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2012-2013/0084/2013084.pdf. 
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than English law has ever been: ‘it is a defence for the operator to show that it was not 
the operator who posted the statement on the website’. 
However, s 5(3) plots a middle way between blanket immunity and the approach of 
the ECD, through enabling the defence to be defeated if the author is unidentifiable, a 
notice of complaint was given to the operator, and there was a failure to respond in 
accordance with regulations. As such, the (future) regulations need to be considered. . 
The regulations will include key factors such as time limits, and disclosure of contact 
details, although the legislation does give a little more detail on what a ‘notice of 
complaint’ should contain. The main thrust of the new approach, and what sets it 
apart from the existing defences, is that the operator would (for identifiable authors) 
be protected against liability through passing on notices, without a requirement to take 
material down if the operator and author comply with certain requirements. 
Draft regulations have been circulated by the Ministry of Justice to selected parties, 
although they have become publicly available through unofficial republication on the 
Internet.60 If the author is already identifiable, no further steps would be needed. If the 
author is not initially identifiable, the complainant would issue a notice to the operator, 
who would transmit it to the author; if the author provided contact information, the 
information could ‘stay up’ without risk to the host. The regulations would add 
further points to the information required in the notice, a 3-day period for the operator 
to pass the notice to the author followed by a 7-day period for a response, and other 
points of detail. However, the Act does not constrain the regulations in a particularly 
serious way, so other schemes (more or less onerous in terms of the obligations on the 
operator and/or author) could be adopted without amending the primary legislation; 
the regulations do, however, require parliamentary assent. The Government also noted 
the possibility of requiring that details be passed the other way, i.e. giving the 
complainant information about the user.61 This latter aspect is indeed considered in 
the draft regulations, although it appears to be permitted rather than required by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 ‘Defamation Bill: MoJ Informal Consultation on Regulations under Clause 5’ (Inforrm Blog, 4 
January 2013) http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/defamation-bill-moj-informal-consultation-
on-regulations-under-clause-5/  
61 Ibid [85]. 
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proposed legislation. After a late amendment, though, malice on the part of the 
website operator now defeats the defence.62 
The Act resembles (but is less favourable towards the service provider than) the 
simple ‘notice and notice’ system used for copyright in Canada,63 where there is a 
requirement on a host to pass on the notice to the user, with no liability or requirement 
for further action. (Surprisingly, the pre-Bill paper from the Government64 did not 
take the opportunity to discuss this precedent).  The Act requires table 1 to be 
revisited, as set out below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Defamation Act 2013, s 5(11). 
63 A voluntary system since 2000, and a statutory one since 2012. See P Chwelos, ‘Internet service 
providers report, prepared for Industry Canada’ (20 January 2006) http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-
dppi.nsf/vwapj/ISP%20Report%202006-01-20.pdf/$file/ISP%20Report%202006-01-20.pdf; Copyright 
Modernization Act (SC 2012, c. 20), adding new § 41.25 to the Copyright Act, RSC c. C-42. 
64, Ministry of Justice, Government response to the report of the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Defamation Bill (Cm 8295, 2012) [85-88]. 
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 Unlawful Lawful 
Leave Up 
(with ID) 
• Harm to complainant 
(reputation), with remedy 
available (action against 
author only) 
• Deserved harm to author 
(easier for complainant to 
pursue) 
• Neutral to host (immunity) 
• Neutral to reader 
• Neutral to complainant 
• Minor harm to author (opportunity 
cost of defending) 
• Neutral to host 
• Benefit to reader (access to legal 
content) 
 
Take down 
(no ID) 
[As table 1, above] 
• Benefit to complainant 
• Neutral to author 
• Neutral to host (immunity) 
• Neutral to reader 
 
[As table 1, above] 
• Neutral to complainant, or 
(undeserved) minor benefit from 
suppression of critical speech despite 
legality) 
• Harm to author (suppression of legal 
speech, probably with no remedy 
against complainant or host) 
• Neutral or minor harm to host 
(possible dispute with author, but 
terms and conditions likely to prevent 
legal action, so limited to possible 
loss of business) 
• Harm to reader (denied access to 
legal content) 
Table 2: options available to a host under Defamation Act 2013 
If the content is unlawful and identified, the outcome is the removal of the 
complainant’s remedy against the host, and shifts from minor harm to harm for the 
author (legal action by the complainant becomes easier) and from harm to neutral for 
the host.  If the content is lawful and identified, the host’s minor harm is replaced by a 
neutral outcome, but the author experiences minor harm through being forced to 
defend.  If the content is unidentified, the analysis is unchanged. The host is the major 
‘winner’ if the content is identified (although there is some shift of labour towards the 
author and also a limited remedy for the complainant), so it now has an incentive to 
choose the ‘leave up’ option. This is very close to the situation in the US for 
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defamation (but not copyright) under the Communications Decency Act.  On the 
contrary, if the author is unidentified, the host continues to have the incentive to 
choose ‘take down’.  The harms of this option, discussed in connection with table 1, 
are thus reduced if the content is identified.  It can therefore be said that the UK is 
considering the radical approach of the CDA, but only for defamation and for 
identifiable authors. 
Importantly, a debate has continued (recalling the issue disputed in Tamiz, discussed 
above) on whether a notice would have to show that material is unlawful or merely 
defamatory. As there, this is a question on whether it is sufficient for the complainant 
to show that the words are defamatory, or if they must show that relevant defences 
(e.g. fair comment, qualified privilege) are not applicable. The ‘defamatory’ approach 
is what appears in s 5(6)(b) of the 2013 Act, but was criticised by the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights.65 This is at least a better situation than what has prevailed in the 
application of the ECD, in that the courts will be given a single, clear test. However, 
if the end result is the ‘defamatory’ test, the intention of the Act may not be matched 
in practice in respect of unidentified lawful (but defamatory) speech, for the reasons 
set out in table 2, above. 
E. Defamation as a special case 
Much of the material discussed in this section relates specifically to defamation. The 
first issue, regarding notice, is an interpretation of the ECD, but because of the 
discussion of the relevance of defences, some work would be necessary if it were 
desired that the same end (i.e. shifting the burden towards the person making the 
allegation and sending the notice) be achieved for all areas of liability. More 
problematic, in terms of an horizontal approach, are the remaining issues. The concept 
of publication is specific to the law of defamation (and perhaps privacy), and the 
common law on this point is self-contained. Indeed, as discussed below in the context 
of search engines, copyright law encompasses other, different concepts such as 
making available and authorization. Finally, the development of entirely novel notice 
and takedown schemes, including the placing of substantial weight on whether an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative scrutiny: Defamation Bill (2012-13, HL 80, HC 810) 
[36-40]. 
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author is identifiable is taking place within a defamation statute which could not, 
without further parliamentary intervention, affect liability in other areas.  
The result of the three developments would therefore be likely to create a system for 
defamation that is favourable to the interests of the host (and, as set out in table 2, the 
reader), while preserving a system for other areas of liability which is much more 
favourable towards complainants. Considering Howarth’s discussion of libel reform, 
where he notes that the consequences of change is to shift risk towards the victims of 
content (i.e. away from publishers) and increase the expectations placed upon 
judges,66 it is difficult to conclude that due consideration has been given to this matter, 
or to explain why harm to reputation is so much less serious than harm to intellectual 
property rightsholders. 
Furthermore, the host will also need to be aware of matters outside of liability. We 
have already noted the SABAM decision in the context of article 12 ECD. However, in 
the case of hosts, there is a further, more relevant decision to consider: SABAM v 
Netlog, where non-liability requirements on hosts were considered by the Court of 
Justice.67 Although both cases had a similar interpretation of the relevant Directives, 
and use similar language, the second decision does serve to remind us that while 
section 97A CDPA cases in England to date have involved conduits, the section (and 
the underlying Information Society Directive) is applicable in the case of all service 
providers.68 An entity need not be a conduit or indeed any kind of intermediary (for 
the purposes of articles 12-15 ECD) to be a service provider. As such, while the exact 
treatment of such an application against a social networking or video sharing site (or 
indeed a search engine, as noted below) awaits elaboration, this copyright-specific 
remedy only strengthens the conclusion that hosts are in very different positions when 
it comes to defamation and copyright. 
IV. SEARCH ENGINES 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 D Howarth, ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74 MLR 845, 876-7. 
67 Case C-360/10 Netlog. 
68 Section 97A(3) CDPA, referring to Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, 
regulation 2, which in turn uses the language of Directive 2000/31/EC, which itself adopts the 
definition in the technical standards directives, 98/34/EC and 98/48/EC; ‘any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a 
recipient of services’.  
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Member states were not required to apply the ECD to search engines. The divergent 
treatment of search engines was an issue in the Commission’s review of it.69 As the 
UK has not done so, the argument here has turned on the common-law publication 
question. In Metropolitan Schools v Designtechnica,70 Google (as a search engine) 
was held not to be a publisher. In the highest level treatment of the matter to date, the 
Supreme Court of Canada found that in general, a hyperlink without more does not 
constitute publication for the purposes of defamation law.71 Taking the two points 
together, and considering the matter from the point of view of the search engine 
operator, the common law is serving it well. However, this is not necessarily the case 
in all common law jurisdictions; there is a suggestion (not developed because the 
court reached its decision for other reasons) of some doubt regarding Metropolitan in 
a New Zealand decision of 2012,72 and both criticism of the finding and rejection of 
the relevance in an Australian case (at the Victoria Supreme Court) of the same 
year.73 
Yet turning once more to copyright law, there has been a shift in favour of liability for 
linking (predominantly as an infringement of the ‘making available’ right). Compare 
the conviction of Vickerman74 for fraud offences in respect of a ‘links’ website and 
the extradition proceedings in respect of O’Dwyer75 with the earlier dismissal of 
charges in Rock & Overton.76. The question of linking as communication to the public 
is before the Court of Justice in the pending case of Svensson.77  
These developments could be confined to copyright law, given that they turn on the 
interpretation of copyright statutes on copyright concepts. Taken in conjunction with 
the recommendation of the parliamentary committee on privacy and injunctions for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 SEC(2011) 1641 (n 7) 27. 
70 [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB). 
71 Crookes v Newton 2011 SCC 47. 
72 A v Google NZ [2012] NZHC 2352 [74]. This case is mentioned by the Court of Appeal in Tamiz in 
the context of applying Byrne v Deane: [32]. 
73 Trkulja v Google (No 5) [2012] VSC 533 [27] (criticism of Metropolitan), [29] (not the common law 
of Australia). 
74 Newcastle Crown Court, 14 August 2012: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/anton-vickerman-sentencing-
remarks-14082012.pdf  
75 Westminster Magistrates’ Court, 13 January 2012: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/us-v-odwyer-ruling.pdf  
76 Gloucester Crown Court, 6 February 2010: 
http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/legal/reginavsrockoverton.pdf  
77 Case C-466/12 Svensson. 
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new (statutory?) obligations on search engines to block unlawful material,78 however, 
the shifts in liability may be a basis for renewed pressure from those favouring the 
interests of claimants to regulate search engine liability rather than exclude it in its 
entirety. Although the approach under defamation law has been criticised as favouring 
speech over reputation and taking a blanket approach to a complex problem,79 this is 
demonstrably consistent with the debate regarding hosts, in that the impact of 
defamation law on online expression is being steadily minimised. 
There are at least five questions to consider regarding the future regulation of search 
engines, as set out in Table 3. 
(a) Has the reconsideration of the ‘common law publisher’ question Tamiz at both 
stages, or the reception of it outside of England, undermined the basis of 
Metropolitan? The extension of Metropolitan to a context where a statutory defence 
already existed has clearly provoked criticism of the common law approach.  
(b) If new statutory provisions for privacy are introduced, will that create pressure – 
particularly in the context of the ‘right to be forgotten’ debate80 – for extending to 
defamation complainants the same opportunities as available for those in privacy 
claims? Here, the relevance of a data protection approach should be noted, 
particularly given the argument that a search engine is a data processor.81 
(c) If obligations on search engines become more onerous, will providers lobby the 
European Union more energetically so as to be included within Articles 12-15 of a 
revised ECD? At this point in time it seems unusual that European harmonisation is 
necessary in respect of caches but not search engines. 
(d) Can section 97A CDPA and/or section 17 DEA be used against search engines, 
given that a search engine is still an ISSP, albeit not within the immunity schemes?82 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and injunctions (2010-12, HL 273, HC 1443) 
[110-115]. 
79 G Chan, ‘Defamation via hyperlinks: more than meets the eye’ (2012) 128 LQR 346, 348. 
80 See for example European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ COM(2012) 11, 
art 7; pending Case C-131/12 Google Spain; P Bernal, ‘A Right to Delete?’ (2011) 2(2) European 
Journal of Law & Technology http://ejlt.org/article/view/75/144. 
81 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp148_en.pdf 24. 
82 Discussed above (n 68). 
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There is no obvious textual reason why not, but again, the actual use of these powers 
would affect the tolerance of search engine providers of the current lacuna regarding 
liability. 
(e) Does Article 10 ECHR restrict blocking, filtering or takedown requirements? The 
indications from international human rights bodies are that restrictions on Internet 
access are suspect,83 and the Court of Justice (and legislative debate within the 
European Union) notes the importance of freedom of expression and of access to 
information. The Electronic Commerce Directive itself recognises the problem.84 
There is also a long (underdeveloped) tradition of considering the regulation of 
technology as a relevant factor on the part of the European Court of Human Rights.85 
Most recently, it has found a violation of article 10 in the case of a court order 
blocking users from accessing material hosted by a hosting service (Google Sites) 
because of illegal content on one site hosted there.86  
V. CONCLUSION  
It is now possible to compare the position of the intermediary across the areas of law 
and types of intermediary, as follows. 
 Defamation Privacy Copyright 
Mere Conduit Article 12 ECD, no 
liability 
Article 12 ECD, no 
liability 
Article 12 ECD, but 
also section 97A 
CDPA and graduated 
response 
Host Article 14 ECD, 
interpreted by Tamiz, 
alongside s 1 
Defamation Act 1996 
Assumed similar to 
defamation, except for 
s 1 Defamation Act 
1996 and s 5 
Article 14 ECD 
(alone), and presumed 
section 97A CDPA 
[Low Hurdle NTD] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 A/HRC/17/27, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression’ (16 May 2011) 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. 
84 ECD, recital 46: ‘the removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of the 
principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level’. 
85 See for example Mustafa v Sweden (2008) 52 EHRR 803; regarding the right of a tenant to install a 
satellite dish to receive foreign programmes: article 10 applies to State actions which ‘(prevent) a 
person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites’ [32].  
86 Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 December 2012). 
 	   22	  
and common law 
publication, and s 5 
Defamation Act 2013 
[Moderate to High 
Hurdle Notice and 
Takedown (NTD)]. 
‘High’ hurdle means it 
is difficult for a 
claimant to overcome 
the host’s defence. 
Defamation Act 2013 
[Moderate Hurdle 
NTD] 
Search Engine Common law 
publication, no liability 
(Metropolitan). 
Unclear (but note 
parliamentary 
committee 
recommendation and 
data protection issues) 
Unclear (but with 
increasing attention to 
the consequences of 
linking) 
Table 3. Summary of differing obligations of intermediaries 
Intermediaries are thus already being asked to do more in the case of copyright as 
compared with defamation, and the current position is one pointing towards further 
divergence, with caselaw and proposed legislation reducing the obligations of 
intermediaries regarding defamation, but their obligations regarding copyright 
becoming more onerous, even in the case of mere conduits. The position of privacy is 
close to that of defamation but with some ‘missing pieces’, alongside proposals to 
take a different approach being considered. But is this, as it should be, the result of 
due consideration of the relative merits of intellectual property, reputation and privacy 
rights, each set against the threat to freedom of expression posed by poorly calibrated 
notice and takedown schemes? Or, as it seems, a series of piecemeal changes which 
produce a system that overprotects some interests and underprotects others? The next 
steps in the review of the ECD do present an opportunity to ‘fix’ some of the 
problems, but restraint on the part of national lawmakers in applying ‘quick fixes’ is 
also necessary. The inconclusive outcome of the Tamiz appeal surely heightens the 
clamour for a more considered, coherent take on intermediary liability to be at the 
heart of the next legislative response. 
 
